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ALTERNATIVES IN GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF
ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE
RAiip

F. FucHst
I

T

HE situation today which is thought to require governmental
changes of a far-reaching character, involving primarily the
development of administrative devices, is being diagnosed by
learned writers and investigators. Its origins lie in the period
when the Glorious Revolution in England and the American
Revolution established substantial freedom of economic enterprise.
The resulting competitive system has permitted great inequality
of family incomes. This inequality has promoted the capital accumulation necessary to an expanding economic order and has not
prevented an almost continuous increase in the welfare of the
masses of the population. The rise of the corporate form of
business organization has at the same time permitted a concentration of control of producing enterprises which far exceeds the
possibilities of individual or partnership management. This concentration, although in specific instances it probably goes beyond
the point of maximum efficiency,' has on the whole been a necessary accompaniment of modern technology, without which the
potentialities of large-scale, machine production could not have
been realized under private ownership.2
In the long run, however, the entire utility and value of accumulations of capital are dependent upon their actual employment in
the production of goods that can be sold. Obviously goods can be
sold only to purchasers who have the requisite wherewithal. That
wherewithal necessarily is derived from the income from past sales
of goods or services,3 the products of previous production. Pret Professor of Law, Washington University.
3 Watkins, The Change in Trust Policy 1I (1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 926.
2 Laidler, Concentration of Control in American Industry (1931), and Berle
and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), summarize
the available information in regard to the extent of large-scale corporate
control.
8Except in so far as credit expansion for greater or less periods of time
supplies purchasing power which goes beyond the income from previous production.
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vious income will be translated into purchases to the extent that
the desires of the recipients lead them to spend it, either for consumable goods or for capital goods. Capital goods, however, will
not be purchased unless there exist real or supposed income-creating
uses for them in the production of consumers' goods or further
capital equipment which can be sold. Ultimately the utility of
capital goods and the demand for them are dependent upon the
existence of an effective demand for the consumers' goods which
are the end-purposes of all production. If, therefore, the income
from a given cycle of production passes partially into the hands
of accumulators of capital and if the prospect is that future wage,
interest, rent, and profit payments, upon which the market for the
products of this capital depends, will create only an inadequate
market accompanied by further accumulations of capital funds,
the income in question will not be spent. Thus the money offered
for the products of current production will be diminished by the
amount of capital funds unsuccessfully seeking investment, and
the producers who receive money will be correspondingly less able
to purchase the products of future production. Such is the situation
which prevailed even in 1929 when the economic system in the
United States was operating at approximately only eighty per cent
of capacity and large classes of people were going without the
necessities of life.4 During the depression, of course, conditions
have become much worse.
Thus the vice in the economic order of today lies in a maldistribution of income which withholds many necessities of life from
millions of people, prevents full utilization of existing productive
equipment, and causes accumulations of capital funds to go begging
for safe investment. It follows that the remedy is a redistribution
of income such that the purchasing power of the masses will be
correctly proportioned to the accumulations of capital that come
largely from the surplus receipts of individuals who are paid the
larger incomes. Such a redistribution could be effected in two
principal ways within the framework of a money economy: either
4 Nourse and Associates, America's Capacity to Produce (1934) 421. This
publication of the Brookings Institution and its companion volumes, Leven,
Moulton and Warburton, America's Capacity to Consume (1934); Moulton,
The Formation of Capital (1935); and Moulton, Income and Economic Progress (1935), present a diagnosis of present economic conditions, based upon
carefully assembled data, which, it is believed, supports the statements in
the text.
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the wages and other earnings of the receivers of small incomes
might be increased without corresponding price increases or the
prices of goods and services might be reduced without corresponding reductions in the earnings of the receivers of small
incomes.' Needless to say, neither alternative has proven sufficiently acceptable to the managers of American business during
the period which has followed the disappearance of the frontier.
Thus the government and the people whose agent it is, confronted with concentrated economic power as Henry VII and
Henry VIII were confronted by the power of the barons,' must
consider ways and means of securing the service of the commonwealth by those who participate most largely in it. The choice of
ways and means necessarily involves prediction as to the working
of alternatives, and these alternatives involve more largely legal
and administrative than economic considerations. Where the
economist deals primarily with the effects of alternative policies
upon welfare as that is commonly understood, the lawyer and the
political scientist are concerned with the mechanisms whereby
particular policies can best be furthered." Statesmanship, of
course, embraces the choice of policies and of methods in terms
of the values which it is deemed important to serve. In the present
situation the policy which is essential if the values made possible
by large-scale production are to be realized has been pointed out.
5 These alternatives are discussed in Moulton, Income and Economic Progress, op. cit. supra note 4, cc. 7 and 8. Such measures might or might not
result in an actual diminution of the earnings of the receivers of large incomes.
If business activity were stimulated as a result of increased markets, the
decreased unit costs incident to fuller utilization of productive capacity might
offset the effect of wage increases or price decreases.
6
Commons, The Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924), especially
cc. 1-3, and 7-8, develops in intriguing fashion the analogy between the
power of modern property and the power of feudalism, together with the role
of government and law in dealing with them.
7 There is overlapping here, of course. Thus, while the necessity of directing a greater portion of the national income into consumptive channels in
order to stimulate production is a matter of economics, and while such questions as the relative effectiveness of unionization and legislation as means of
increasing the earnings of labor present problems of administrative effectiveness, the question of whether profit-seeking enterprises will be more likely to
increase wages or to cut prices as a matter of business policy turns both upon
economic analysis of probable financial consequences and upon estimates of
the prbbable response of business administrators to situations confronting
them.
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Lawyers and students of administration fail in their primary
function if they neglect to explore the question of ways and means
upon a scale as large as the problem presented. In so far as
knowledge is lacking it must be obtained, and rapidly.
There may be said to be five possible alternative ways and means
of effecting a distribution of income in the United States which
will correctly proportion expenditures for consumers' goods and
the accumulation of capital. These are (1) resolute maintenance
by government of competition in various lines of production so as
to induce the continued prevalence of minimum prices; (2) continuous regulation of business by administrative agencies of government so as to compel the observance of polices which will lead to
the desired distribution of income; (3) control of private productive enterprises by managements in which competing claimants
to the benefits of their operation are represented in due proportion;
(4) operation of government-owned enterprises by corporations
established for that purpose, and (5) direct ownership and operation of productive facilities by the government. The first of these
ways would represent a return to conditions that once prevailed
in most fields of economic activity and still prevail over limited
areas. The second would represent an extension of previouslyknown methods of administrative control over the existing economic
system. The last three ways would represent excursions into new
methods of conducting economic affairs for which, however, there
arc precedents even in capitalist nations.
Appraisal of the five suggested alternatives with reference to
the attainment of the desired policy must be made in terms of such
experience as has been had and in terms of theoretical workability
as indicated by the distribution of rights, powers, and duties among
individuals whose reaction to them in the manner intended, without
generating self-defeating conflicts of interest or stalemates in
procedure, may or may not be forthcoming. It is, of course, not
necessary that one or the other alternative be adopted to the exclusion of the remainder. It is quite possible, for example, that
a workable system might be found to comprise free enterprise and
competition among handicraftsmen; private ownership of marketing enterprises on a proprietary or cooperative basis, with regulation simply of competitive practices; detailed regulation or
democratic producer control of private manufacture of finished
products; licensed individual enterprise in agriculture, subject to
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no further governmental regulation; operation of basic industries
by government-owned corporations; and direct governmental provision of certain essential services. Quite possibly, however, particular control devices will operate differently on a limited scale
from their operation over a wide field. Obviously a small regulatory or managerial unit can be more easily keyed to continuous
efficiency than a large one, but numerous small units will present
greater variety of performance. Standards which prevail in a
community where the tone is set by one type of control will affect
the contemporary operation of a different type, as the corrupting
influence of private wealth has tended to destroy governmental
standards,' thus making it hazardous to predict the success or
failure of large-scale operations on the basis of small-scale experience. Similarly, governmental control of particular aspects of
private enterprise with no provision for dealing with collateral
consequences may be quite different from identical control in the
presence of means of providing for such consequences.9
II
The school of thought in the United States which pins its faith
upon the restoration and maintenance of small-scale free enterprise
as a means of avoiding both undue concentration of control and
undue concentration of wealth continues to command numerous
and important adherents." Few there are who arise to deny the
8

In a prophetic address as President of the American Economic Association
in 1887, Professor Henry Carter Adams foresaw the discrediting of government through the influence of wealth which afterward took place. 1 Publications of the Amer. Econ. Ass'n, no. 6.
sPerhaps the principle difference between the New Deal legislation and
previous regulatory measures'lay in the apparent effort of the former to provide for simultaneous control of most of the important aspects of economic
activity, with attempted fairness to the various affected interests. See Fuchs,
The Constitutionality of the Recovery Program (1933) 19 St. Louis L. Rev. 1,
6-11. Had the New Deal's administration been equal to its advance analysis
and planning, popular and judicial support might have increased rather than
diminished.
10 Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom (1913), is commonly taken as the
classic twentieth-century expression of this point of view. Wilson, it is
true, devoted much time in his addresses to bringing out the need of preserving the open door of 6pportunity to enterprising young "Jacks" who
might slay the less hardy giants of immoderately large-scale corporate enterprise. He was, however, careful to disavow any intention to place an arbitrary limitation upon the size of business undertakings (p. 166). And, on the
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soundness of traditional laissez faire economic theory under the
assumed conditions," although the need of policing competitive
practices, especially as they affect the consumer, seems clearly to
require incorporation into the theory.'
It is the plain lesson of
history, however, that small-scale enterprise on the whole does not
maintain itself in the presence of machine methods of production.
Whether by reason of the requirements of modern technology or
by reason of opportunities for rigging the market, or both, the
growth of large-scale corporate control has continued at an augmented rate. 3 It will require governmental measures if this
tendency is to be checked.
The chief governmental measure thus far employed to cope with
the trend toward concentration of industrial control has been, of
course, the Sherman Act. 4 The line between legality and illegality
having been laid down in the Act in terms that were incapable of
precise application, the courts, to whom enforcement was entrusted, necessarily proceeded to the best of their ability to decide
cases without other aids than such criteria as they were able to
develop for themselves. As respects combinations of ownership it
other hand, his figure of the locomotive (pp. 281 et seq.) with its "parts so
assembled and adjusted that friction is reduced to a minimum," is as perfect
a figure of speech as could be devised in praise of a planned, coordinated
economic order.
11 See, for example, Norman Thomas, The Choice Before Us (1934) 16.
12Sussman and Ganer, Standards and Grades of Quality for Food and Drugs
(1935) 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 578; Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and
Drugs Legislation (1933) 1 Law and Contemporary Problems 3; Crawford
(1933) Technical Problems in Food and Drug Law Enforcement, 1 id. at 36.
13 Berle and Means, op. cit. supra note 2, at 35-40.
1426 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §
2-7 (1926).
1 Whatever may have been the shifts in Supreme Court dicta regarding the
Act's literal interpretation as prohibiting "every" contract, combination, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade on the one hand or its construction as prohibiting only "unreasonable" contracts and combinations on the other hand,
(see the writer's Legal Control of Petroleum Production (1931) 16 St. Louis
L. Rev. 189, 202) it is obvious that, unless merger were to remain entirely
outside the scope of the Act, literal interpretation was possible only if the
phrase, "restraint of trade", had a restricted meaning as applied to combinations of ownership; for otherwise all partnerships and corporations would
have been condemned. But there was no common law doctrine of restraint of
trade in relation to ownership of businesses. Holmes, J., dissenting, in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 405-406 (1904).
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is evident that no criteria which furnish either guidance to business
men or measures of economic desirability have been worked out."
It seems evident that the ordinary courts could not be expected to
develop such criteria. The judges are numerous, non-expert in
economic analysis, and dependent upon litigants and counsel of
varying resources and ability to furnish the necessary facts.
The alternatives to judicially-developed criteria of legality are
either definite legislative prescriptions or standards which are to
be administratively applied. No serious proposal for exact legislative enactment has been made, nor is it likely that any will be.
Nothing short of a mathematical specification of, say, the percentage of an industry or trade that might come under one control,
would be susceptible of anything like uniform judicial enforcement. In view of the varying conditions in different industries it
manifestly would be impossible for the legislature to go farther
than lay down a formula for administrative application.
In the Clayton Act an attempt was made to provide a standard
to be administratively applied in cases where one corporation had
acquired capital stock in another. Such acquisition was forbidden
"where the effect .. .may be to substantially lessen competition
between the corporation whose stock is .. .acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in
any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line
of commerce."' Enforcement was entrusted to the Federal Trade
Commission.'8 This enactment has failed for a number of reasons.
In the first place it is easily circumvented by other forms of merger
than stock acquisition. In the second place the Supreme Court
has insisted upon a high degree of judicial review of Federal Trade
Commission determinations in stock acquisition cases and has exercised its powers of review in such a manner as virtually to paralyze
the Commission's efforts at enforcement.' 9 In the third place the
16 The excellent summary of the facts in the principal combination cases,
contained in Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws (1932)
32 Col. L. Rev. 179, demonstrates the lack of any correlation between discoverable fact-states and decisions as to legality.
1.738 Stat. 730, § 7 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A.
18 (1926).
Is38 Stat. 730, § 11 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 21 (1926).
19International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U. S. 291 (1930);
Note (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 1042; McFarland, Judicial Control of the Federal
Trade Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission (1933) 66-68,
85-87.
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statutory standard of legality is largely worthless when it comes
to distinguishing between economically beneficial and economically
harmful consolidations of corporate control. The first two defects
probably could be remedied by statutory changes. 0 It is the third
defect which is crucial.
The vice in the section of the Clayton Act which is under discussion lies in its condemnation of all substantial lessening of
competition through stock acquisition, without regard to consequences. Congress might have condemned stock acquisitions which
in the judgment of the Federal Trade Commission would diminish
competition to the point of making it possible harmfully to maintain
prices or depress wages, perhaps providing for advance determinations by the Commission, and have extended the prohibition to other
forms of business consolidation. If it had, the Commission would
have been given a control coextensive with the problem attacked,
and the door would have been open to approval of mergers that
promoted efficiency without adding to that maldistribution of
income which, as has been seen, is the basic evil to be overcome.
Whether such a formula could be administratively applied in a
satisfactory manner is, of course, an open question. If Congress
laid down the further statutory guide that it was its purpose to
bring about the observance of such price and wage policies as would
achieve the proportion between profits and wages which should be
found most conducive to the complete utilization of productive
capacity and of the facilities of interstate commerce, there would
certainly be a basis from which to start in applying the law to
particular cases. The question then would become one of whether
the economic results of past business mergers could be ascertained
with sufficient certainty to furnish a basis for forecasting the consequences of future consolidations-making due allowance, of course,
for possible changing factors such as technological improvements,
developments in labor organization, and the like. That question
cannot be answered here.
Even assuming, however, that economic science has progressed
to the point where fairly accurate prediction of the consequences
20 Statutory limitation of the scope of judicial review within the present
governmental framework would, of course, have to conform to constitutional
requirements. The present discussion, however, which deals with the practicability of alternative means of control, must envisage constitutional as well as
statutory changes when necessary. If it proved to be unconstitutional to give
the Commission a sufficiently free hand, the Constitution could be amended.
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of business mergers is possible, there would remain obstacles to the
carrying out of measures such as the one proposed. Prediction of
the sort here involved is based upon a handling of data in which
atypical instances are outweighed in the calculations. There is a
clear possibility of error in prediction unless such instances are
recognized as they arise and are dealt with on a separate basis.
It is questionable whether the Commission could recognize atypical
instances in the cases before it or, if it could, whether it would
be practicable to make allowance for them; for the factors which
make an instance exceptional are likely to be both elusive and
ephemeral. Thus the intent with which a merger was sought to be
effected might be quite different from the intent usually prevailing and might greatly modify the probable consequences; but intent
is manifestly difficult to ascertain and subject to easy change. It
appears that such factors ought to be disregarded if administration
is to be effective. So long, however, as the psychology of a system
of private property continues to prevail, it is at best doubtful
whether such disregard can be permitted. If, for example, it
appeared in a particular case that the owners or managers of
businesses sought to be merged sincerely believed that efficiency
would be furthered by the consolidation and if some or all of them
apparently were moved by enthusiasm for the creation of an institution that would better serve the needs of all to whom it ministered,
the courts if not the Commission would strain hard to prevent a
blocking of the merger. Or if, as the Supreme Court felt the
situation to be in the InternationadShoe Co. case,2 a failing business could be saved by incorporation into a consolidated enterprise,
it would require extremely resolute official action to forbid a
merger that would be legitimate according to all ordinary ethical
standards, even where there was a statistical probability of harmful long-run consequences. At any rate, a clear expression of
legislative intention to be ruthless, and a virtual elimination of
judicial review, 22 by constitutional amendment if necessary, would
21 International Shoe Co. v. Pederal Trade Commission, 280 _U.S. 291 (1930),
cited supra note 19.
22 So long as any judicial review remains, it will be possible for the courts
to reverse administrative decisions almost to the extent they desire, since the
categories of matters to which such review may extend can be expanded or
contracted quite freely. If there is judicial review, it almost necessarily
extends to questions of jurisdiction, and any determination necessary to a
decision can be said to be jurisdictional. Thus whether there is involved in a
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be essential to the success of such a program. None of the public
advocates of preserving small business enterprises thus far has had
the hardihood to propose such thoroughgoing legislation.
Public utility holding companies, however, by a noteworthy
addition to the regulatory acts of Congress, may not acquire the
securities or utility assets of any business if the Securities and
Exchange Commission finds that "such acquisition will tend toward
interlocking relations or the concentration of control of publicutility companies, of a kind or to an extent detrimental to the
public interest or the interest of investors or consumers."'
Each
existing holding company, moreover, is to be compelled "as soon
as practicable after January 1, 1938" to limit its operations to a
"single integrated public utility system."2
Although this legislation is the product of public indignation over numerous abuses
and would have been impossible without strong executive leadership, its successful operation might provide a model for similar
handling of other types of concentrated corporate control. Whether
its operation can be successful will be dependent upon the adequacy
of administrative techniques that are the products of numerous
prior developments in governmental regulation.
particular case the "public interest" which the Federal Trade Commission Act
requires the Commission to find before instituting a proceeding against unfair
competition, has been declared to be a jurisdictional question upon which the
courts may reverse the Commission. Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280
U. S. 19 (1929). Similarly, the proposition that the courts may reverse an administrative determination which is not supported by substantial evidence may
be made the basis of an adverse decision through the simple device of denying
to statistics upon which the administrative body has relied the pertinence
and therefore the character of evidence. In addition, the failure of the
administrative body to give credence to the opinions of certain witnesses may
be said to justify reversal on account of procedural error. The two latter
devices were made use of by the Court in the International Shoe Co. case,
supra note 21, in order to overcome the significance attached by the Commission to certain figures concerning the geographical distribution of the sales of
the concerns involved, and to give effect to the testimony of certain corporate
officers. Instances are numerous in other fields of administration. See, for
example, Kwoek Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454 (1920); Lloyd Sabaudo
Societa v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329 (1932).
23Aet of Aug. 26, 1935, e. 687, tit. I, ff 9, 10 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 79i, 79j (Supp. 1935).
24 Act of Aug. 26, 1935, e.687, tit I, § 11 (f) (1935), 15 U. S. C. A.
79 (k) (Supp. 1935).
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III
As an alternative to preserving competition in industry and
trade it is theoretically possible, of course, to compel the observance
of desired ecconomie policies through governmental regulation of
private businesses, be their size what it may. The trend toward
regulated capitalism in the United States and western Europe has
been too marked to require demonstration here. As respects railroads and other public utilities and banks it has gone to great
lengths in this country. As applied to competitive practices it is
accepted on all sides as desirable.'
In the National Industrial
Recovery Act26 it was sought to sweeten thoroughgoing control of
virtually all phases of business operation by coating the regulation
with the designation "codes of fair competition," which apparently
was thought to be reminiscent of the more palatable control of
competitive practices. The Supreme Court has nevertheless seen
through the protective covering." Recent measures extend ostensibly permanent regulation to new phases of business activity.'
Many of the measures thus far adopted, however, deal with the
symptoms rather than with the causes of the national economic
disorder. Unfair competitive practices are stimulated by rivalry
in the capture of shrinking markets. To forbid them while failing
to check the relative inadequacy of consumer purchasing power
is to assume a difficult task of repression. Similarly, the policing
of securities markets in which owners of capital funds are seeking
avidly for opportunities for sound investment that do not exist in
sufficient quantity presents a greater problem than would the control of a market in which the investor could be more discriminating.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act,29 of course, was an avowedly
25National Industrial Conference Board, Public Regulation of Competitive
Practices (1925) 45-47, 53-54, 208-209.
26 48 Stat. 195, tit. I (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 701-712 (Supp. 1933).
27 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
28Securities Act, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended 48 Stat. 906 (1934), and
Aug. 9, 1935, c. 498, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 77a-77mm (Supp. 1935); Securities
Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 78a-78jj (Supp. 1934) ;
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, Aug. 30, 1935, c. 824, 15 U. S. C. A.
§§ 801-827 (Supp. 1935); National Labor Relations Act, July 5, 1935,
c. 372, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-166 (Supp. 1935); Communications Act, 48
Stat. 1064 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-609 (Supp. 1934).
2948 Stat. 31 (1933), as amended Aug. 24, 1935, c. 641, 7 U. S. C. A.
601-624 (Supp. 1935).
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temporary law for restricting production to the measure of inadequate consumer purchasing power. To replace such fragmentary,
surface regulation with legislation designed really to direct the
flow of income into the channels required by a healthy economic
system would be to set up a bureaucratic control of an extent
heretofore undreamt. Price and wage policies, at least, would
require dictation throughout industry and trade. The protection
of legally-conducted enterprises against subversive competition
doubtless would call for licensing of business undertakings. To
supply a background for intelligent prescription in particular
trades and industries and to open up new areas of opportunity,
a national plan of production and distribution, mandatory upon
regulating agencies whose scope was more limited, probably would
be essential.3" It seems obvious that administrative action as distinguished from flat legislative prescription would be necessary in
order to supply needed flexibility.
Procedural difficulties at once suggest themselves. The enterprises to be regulated would remain private. Even without regard
to constitutional requirements, common decency and ingrained
conceptions of due process of law would call for notice and hearing
at every stage at which a private interest was threatened with
adverse action. In connection with administrative acts of specific
application, such as the granting or revocation of licenses or the
entering of orders to desist from illegal practices, the impropriety
of arriving at decisions without adequate hearings, unless urgent
necessity demands, 3 is manifest. The prescribing of the terms and
conditions of numerous transactions engaged in by limited groups
of parties, such as the fixing of railroad rates or the establishment
of minimum wages in specific occupations in particular localities,
usually is subjected to similar procedure.3 2 Quite commonly even
3

oSee Laidler, Socializing Our Democracy (1935) 27-33, for a brief review
of the movement, preceding the New Deal, toward comprehensive national
planning. See also Francis X. Welch, in (1932) 9 Pub. Util. Fortnightly
37-42.
31
North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908).
32 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418
(1890); 36 Stat. 298, § 2 (1910), 45 U. S. C. A. § 12 (1926); United States
v. Baltimore & Ohio By. Co., 293 U. S. 454 (1935). See, however, Wis. Stats.
(1931) §§ 103.02, 101.15, making hearings in regard to administrativelydetermined maximum hours of labor for women to some extent discretionary
with the Industrial Commission.
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the laying down of general rules of a definitely legislative character
by action of administrative authorities is*preceded by hearings in
which interested parties may appear as a matter of right."
Hearings, of course, vary from perfunctory audiences with
officials"' to proceedings which have all the aspects of judicial
trials."5 Except in the fields of taxation, abatement of conditions
dangerous to health or safety, and regulation of such "privileges"
as immigration, however, it is fairly clear that availability of compulsory process to procure testimony, access to opposing evidence,
and observance of reasonable limitations in regard to the pertinence
of evidence relied upon by the administrative authorities are
minimum essentials to a fair hearing." To accord these procedural safeguards requires time-time for notices, time for the
33

Thus, except where the treaty-making power is exercised under 48 Stat.

943 (1934), 19 U. S. C. A. § 1351 (Supp. 1934), changes in tariff schedules

may be made by the President only after hearings conducted by the Tariff
Commission. 46 Stat. 701 (1930), 19 U. S. C. A. § 1336 (Supp. 1934), discussed in the Norwegian Nitrogen Products Corp. v. United States, 288 U. S.
294 (1933); Agricultural Adjustment Act, tit. I, § 22, added Aug. 24, 1935,
c. 641, § 31, 7 U. S. C. A. § 624 (Supp. 1935). Under the National Industrial
Recovery Act the promulgation of codes was not to take place without a
hearing to parties who had not been represented in their formulation, 15
U. S. C. A. §§ 3 (a), 3 (d) (Supp. 1933), although the requirement of
licenses in particular lines of interstate commerce might be imposed without
advance hearing. Id. § 4 (b). Recently the Supreme Court has laid it down
that the constitutional requirement of due process of law includes provision
for executive ',indings" upon which general regulations shall be based.
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S.38 (1935); United States v. A. L. A.
Scheehter Poultry Corp., 295 U. S.495 (1935). Query whether such findings
must, at least in some instances, be grounded upon evidence adduced at

hearings.
34 Such as those commonly accorded by boards of equalization in the assessment of general property taxes. Earl v. Raymond, 188 Ill.
15, 59 N. B. 19
(1900); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373 (1908).
5 The Board of Tax Appeals, for example, which proceeds largely in the
manner of a court, is governed by the rules of evidence prevailing in equity
cases in the District of Columbia. 45 Stat. 872, § 601 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A.
§ 611 (Supp. 1928). The Interstate Commerce Commission is carefully limited
to evidence which has been duly incorporated into the record, upon which to
base its findings. United States v. Abilene & So. Ry. Co., 265 U. S.274 (1924).
36 Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U. S.110 (1922) (issuance of licenses to carry
on the business of real estate brokerage); Missouri v. North, 271 U. S. 40
(1926) (revocation of physician's license). Cf. People v. Department of
Health, 189 N. Y. 187, 82 N. E. 187 (1907) (revocation of milk dealer's
permit).
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taking of oral testimony, time for the preparation of transcripts,
time for arriving at findings, time for judicial review to see to it
that the formalities have been duly observed. It is at best questionable whether a thoroughgoing system of regulation of private
business, requiring such careful procedure at thousands and tens
of thousands of points, would not break down on account of sheer
inability to keep pace with the demands upon it."
Past experience does not furnish a basis for judgment in regard
to the procedural workability of the suggested system of regulation.
In the United States such detailed control has been attempted only
in the case of public utilities. Results in the field of utility regulation have brought despair to some critics,"8 but it should be
remembered that the principal obstacle to success has been the
37 There is less cause for concern over -he possibility of financing such
bureaucratic control or of obtaining the personnel to man it. There is no
reason to suppose that if the country put its mind to it, its vast reserves of
man power would not yield the necessary personnel within a reasonable time,
especially if able individuals at present engaged in the wasteful occupations
of competitive selling and advertising could be diverted to more useful activity.
As regards the cost, it is worthy of note that the bogging down of the economic system during the depression reduced the national income approximately
$34,000,000,000 a year in terms of 1929 dollars. Moulton, Income and Economic Progress (1935) 28. If by a reverse process of seeing to it that the
national income was properly distributed the total could be increased above
the 1929 level of $80,000,000,000 to $100,000,000,000 or more, the bureaucracy
would easily pay for itself many times over.
Another difficulty that may be put to one side concerns the obtaining of
necessary information by the regulating authorities. Obstacles hereafter encountered grow out of the application to the impersonal afflairs of business
enterprises of copstitutional guaranties which are intended to protect the
personal privacy and security of individuals. See the summaries of legislative
provisions and judicial decisions in Handler, The Constitutional Limitations
of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev.
905; Note (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 819. Under the assumption, common to this
entire discussion, that constitutional provisions may be changed to any extent
found to be desirable, the immunities now accorded to business could be withdrawn.
38 Mosher, Electrical Utilities: The Crisis in Control (1929) especially cc. 1
and 6. If there has been a conspicuously successful regulatory agency in the
United States, it has been the Interstate Commerce Commission. Sharfman,
The Interstate Commerce Commission, Part I (1931) c. 7. Yet its operation
for many years has not produced an efficient, coordinated railway system,
prevented the financial abuses which a new flood of railroad bankruptcies is
revealing, or induced reductions in rates in a time of depression. As to the
difficulties involved, see Note (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1382.
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judicial review which has been held to be constitutionally necessary,
whose exercise by the courts has virtually paralyzed important
aspects of regulation."5 It probably is not true that the reasonable
protection which is the due of private property requires such
extensive judicial review, and its restriction in aid of an adequate
system of regulation may be assumed for the purposes of this
discussion. In England, where constitutional restrictions do not
hamper, the attempt to regulate public utilities has not, however,
been conspicuously more successful than in the United States."
Further grounds for skepticism concerning the success of
thorough regulation of private business follow, however, from consideration of the nature of profit-seeking enterprise. To retain
this type of enterprise, at least in its corporate form, and simultaneously to impose restrictions whose purpose is to limit profits
and distribute more of the benefits to consumers and workers is
to create friction and violate the principles of legal mechanics by
imposing conflicting duties upon the same individuals at one time.
Individual enterprisers, no doubt, are free to be altruistic in the
conduct of their businesses if they wish, and the fastening upon
them of duties toward others merely runs counter to their probable
inclinations. The directors and managers of corporations, however,
are not similarly free. Upon them rests a duty to serve the interests
of the stockholders who are their principals.41 That duty, of course,
may be superseded or modified by duties toward the state or toward
other individuals. So long, however, as the selection and tenure
9 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1921);
Barnes, Federal Courts and State Regulation of Utility Rates (1934) 43 Yale
L. J. 417; West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 295 U. S. 662
(1935). The doctrine of the separation of powers bids fair to impose similarly hampering review upon other regulatory agencies to an indefinite extent.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932); Dickinson, Crowefl v. Benson: Judicial
Review of Administrative Determination of Questions of "Constitutional Fact"
(1932) 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1055.
4Dimock, British and American Utilities: A Comparison (1934) 1 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 265.
41In terms of legally-enforcible doctrine, it is more accurate to say that
the duties of management are to the corporation as an entity. Berle and
Means, op. cit. supra note 2, Part II, cc. 5-8. The actual beneficiaries may
not be the stockholders as a whole. Note 42, infra. The prevailing view,
which doubtless motivates legislatures in maintaining corporation laws, however, continues to regard the stockholders as the prime beneficiaries of corporate activity.
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of directors and managers is dependent upon the stockholders,'
the inclination to place the stockholders' interests ahead of public
duties will remain so strong as to be extremely difficult to overcome'
The objectives which are likely to prevail within governmental
regulation, no less than hostility on the part of the governed, with
which it must cope, give ground for reluctance to entrust vast
control powers to an official hierarchy. The directing heads must
of necessity be politicians (in no invidious sense of the word),
and whatever they attempt to accomplish must be compatible with
remaining in office. 4 Especially in a democracy, pressure groups
having special interests to serve are able to favor a friendly
government and to endanger an unfriendly one out of all proportion to their numbers, because of the immediacy and conscious
character of their interest as compared with that of the body
politic. In the absence of a continued public awareness of the
42 The investing stockholders, of course, are to some extent being superseded
in practice by promoters and cliques of managers as the principal controlling
group in the conduct of modern corporations. Berle and Means, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 119-125. Where this situation prevails, the problem here discussed
is not, however, substantially altered. The managers whose acts regulatory
legislation seeks to control remain primarily responsible to profit-seeking
principles, among whom they themselves may or may not be included.
4 Regarding the Federal Securities Act it has been said that the "high
priests" of the legal profession "may be on the threshold of making a new
discovery - that they can train scriveners and the best products of our law
schools to become artists in making registration statements, artists who can
tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth and still chisel the
heart out of the Securities Act. Once the drafting of registration statements
becomes a game, blurred disclosure may become substituted for fundamental
alteration and modification of ethical standards and financial practices."
Douglas, The Lawyer and the Federal Securities Act (1935) 3 Duke Bar
Ass'n Bull. 66. Despite governmental experience in tax collection, avoidance
by taxpayers, not to speak of evasion, continues to be a fairly successful
game. Altman, Recent Developments in Income Tax Avoidance (1934) 29 InI.
L. Rev. 154. Nullification of utility regulation by company officials has also
been described in colorful language. Dimock, supra note 40, at 268-269.
" Nor does it matter particularly whether control be relatively more in the
executive than in the legislature or vice versa. The latter situation doubtless
is to be preferred in such a matter as removal of quasi-judicial officials,
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), because the
legislature is more slow-moving than the executive and is certain to include
representatives of the broadly public point of view as against attempted political aggrandizement. Subversion of impartial, scientific administration can be
accomplished through either channel, however.
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central objectives of government, coupled with a determination to
support the attainment of these objectives so far as practicable,
the officials in power must resist pressure groups at their peril.
Thus government control is at times in danger of being perverted
to the service of vested interests, propertied, occupational, or
geographic.45 If thoroughgoing control should fail on that account,
the results might be disastrous to the entire social fabric.
Considerations such as these have led to the advocacy of economic
control by functional groups, usually with the backing of the
government in maintaining a proper balance of interests, in enforcement of group mandates, or in both. Such control, it is said, would
be less remote, better-informed regarding the problems to be dealt
with, and therefore more palatable. It would, moreover, be nonpolitical. Analysis indicates that, as applied to functional groups
now existing, there is little substance to these claims.
In an effort to cut through the procedural slowness of bureaucratic regulation, to minimize public expense, and to render widespread control acceptable, the National Industrial Recovery Act4
called for the formulation of codes of fair competition by industrial
and trade groups. In the administration of the Act reliance was
placed upon code authorities in trades and industries, whose
function it was to deal with code violations coming within their
competence. The actual authority and responsibility in the promulgation of codes were, however, placed in the President, and
the findings of the code authorities could under the Act be given
no weight in judicial or Federal Trade Commission proceedings,
which were the sole coercive means of enforcement.4 ? Consumers
and in most instances employees" were not represented in the
drafting of the codes or on the code authorities 9 The resulting
45 Slichter, The Government as an Economic Manager (1935) 16 Acad. of
Pol. Sci. Proc. 119; Robinson, The Hoch-Smith Resolution and the Future of
the Interstate Commerce Commission (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 610.
46 48 Stat. 195, tit. I (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 701-712 (Supp. 1933).
47 See Fuchs, Constitutionality of the Recovery Program (1933) 19 St. Louis
L. Rev. 1, 6-7, for a brief account of the mechanics of the Act.
4 See Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements under Administrative Regulation of Employment (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 493, for an account of labor's
participation in control under the N. I.RA.
49Code authorities on which labor was not represented were not permitted
to handle violations of code labor provisions.
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administrative brew was far from being as palatable as had been
hoped."0
Plans of functional control by existing industrial and commercial
groups could succeed in correcting few of the elements of weakness
obtaining in outright governmental regulation. On the contrary,
they probably would introduce weaknesses of their own. Unless
a bait were offered to the interests to be regulated, in the form
of collective rigging of the market in which they operated," the
control which was set up would be likely to be as opposed to their
immediate profit as the prescriptions of public officials. 2 Enforcement, therefore, would be equally difficult, and it would be unaided
by the methods and personnel standards which government has
worked out for itself over a long period of time. Enforcement
personnel might indeed turn out to be superior to that which the
government affords, but there is no assurance that such would be
the case. Even conceding effective administration, furtherance of
the public purpose of a better distibution of income from the
regulated trade or industry can result only if the controlling group
is properly composed. Whether power actually can be placed by
such means in the hands of those whose interests coincide with
the public interest presents a crucial question.
It is consumers and workers who, in addition to the owners and
managers of businesses, require representation in any functional
&OLyon, The National Recovery Administration (1935) 137-140, 162-173,
256-258, 265-295, 444-450.
M1
Greater freedom for trade associations has not been seriously advocated
except as a means of permitting intelligen' competition in the light of the
infotmation anl suggestions made avai;lable through these associations.
Hoover, The Attitude of the Department of Commerce towards Trade Associations (1922) 23 Econ. World (N. s.) 544; Pay, The Trade Association and
Its Place in the Business Fabric (1923) 2 Harv. Bus. Rev. 84. The price
fixing which at times has been accomplished through them, since it operates
without checks at the hands of the government or of opposing interests, is
manifestly a perversion from the standpoint of the general welfare. United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927).
52 Even if the control group is made representive, it will not necessarily
be more so than a well-devised government or more acceptable on that
account. It will, of course, be more representative of the economic group
than a geographically-chosen legislature, but public administrative agencies
can reflect and comprehend the interests to be regulated. Under the N. R. A.
objection was frequently made by the regulated businesses themselves to control by competitors on code authorities or by their agents. Lyon, op. cit. supra
note 50, at 250-255.
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group to which controlling powers are given, if the objectives of
lowering prices and raising wages are to be attained by regulation
rather than competition. There exist no precedents for the inclusion
of consumers in such control agencies. Except where capital goods
or raw materials are absorbed by industries, the consumers of
particular products and services are not a sufficiently definite
group to be incorporated-although the development of a representative consumers' cooperative movement in the United States
would alter the picture in this respect. The workers in industries
and trades, of course, are definitely recognizable groups. Their
organization into unions affords a means of obtaining representation of their interests by delegates whose responsibility can be
enforced. Through collective agreements it is possible to bring
workers and employers together, both for the purpose of laying
down standards in quasi-legislative fashion and for the purpose of
maintaining continuous administration of the prescribed provisions.
Consumers who are organized can be brought into such schemes
by similar methods. Organized farmers can be included in the
same fashion.5"
Seductive as such plans may be, it should be noted that they
are contractual in nature and must be arrived at by a process of
bargaining. Owners remain owners and deal at arm's length with
the other interests represented. Such a process may work well
enough in relation to a single matter such as wages and working
conditions and yet be unsuited to controlling the more numerous
factors that would be involved in the furtherance of a national
policy of redistribution of income. Complete disclosure of the
facts relating to the businesses, labor unions, and other organizations involved would, for example, be essential. That it would
be voluntarily forthcoming seems unlikely. To compel it by govern53

Cooperative agricultural marketing agencies commonly are corporations
engaged simply in the sale of commodities. Hanna, The Law of Cooperative
Marketing Associations (1913) § 119. Their agreements, however, could
easily be made to embrace other matters. In the St. Louis milk shed at the
present time an agreement between the producers' cooperative and the milk
distributors in the city, results in the payment of stipulated sums by both
farmers and distributors for the payment of sanitary inspectors supplementary to those regularly employed by the city. These inspectors are employed
and the funds are handled by a '"Dairy Commission" established for the
purpose. The city, which is a nominal party to the agreement, appoints the
inspectors to its staff for the purpose of investing them with the necessary
powers.
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mental action and at the same time to engage in the task, which
probably would be equally necessary, of preventing unfair practices on the part of one bargaining interest as against the others,'
would be to rely upon the cumbersome procedure and to invite all
of the resistance and generate the friction that threaten the success
of first-hand governmental regulation itself. Experimentation along
these lines is all to the good. Statesmen, however, would do well
to cast about for other means of furthering social objectives."
Rather preferable, apparently, is the practice of consultation
with interest groups on the part of governmental regulatory agencies. Public power remains lodged definitely in the hands of responsible officials whose primary duty is to the interest of the public.
At the same time their action is informed by contact with those
whose affairs are to be regulated. No reason appears why they
cannot balance the scales justly between conflicting interests and
win as well as compel acceptance of their measures. The process
of consultation is different from that of conducting hearings. The
latter usually is formal and more or less advisory in character.
The former involves free exchange of views and information in
informal discussion. It is particularly valuable in advance of the
promulgation of general regulations. Thus far it has been resorted
to voluntarily by officials more often than it has been employed
because of legal prescription. 6 It might easily be required with
54After the manner of the present National Labor Relations Board. National Labor Relations Act, supra note 28. See also Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, supra note 28, § 4, 15 U. S. C. A. § 808.
5
G Attention will not be given here to contrSl of private enterprise by competition at the hands of public enterprise. Experiments in this direction
may accomplish much good. Inherent objections, however, seem to negative
the wisdom of extensive reliance upon such a device. Wasteful duplication of
facilities may be a proper price to pay for escape from evil conditions, but
it seems a confession of ineptitude in the use of more economical means of
control. And the "yardstick" can hardly be accurate in any event. In reading
it so much depends upon accounting methods, and the conditions prevailing
in the enterprises sought to be compared are likely to vary so widely, that
unfairness to one side or the other in the controversies which are certain to
ensue seems inevitable.
56The exercise of delegated legislative powers affecting private interests
seems in England to be commonly accompanied by consultation with those
interests. Wade, Departmental Legislation (1933) 5 Camb. ,. J. 77. The
practice in this country has not developed to a similar degree. The outstanding instance of consultation on a definitely-announced basis, the Federal Trade
Commission's trade practice conference procedure, looks toward voluntary
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considerable uniformity in many fields of governmental control'3
Administrative control by public officers, acting according to
established methods and in the light of regular conferences with
interested groups, seems more promising than any of the other
methods previously reviewed as a means of attaining necessary
social objectives through private business. There remain for consideration the less orthodox alternatives originally suggested.

IV
Amazingly little constructive thought has as yet been devoted to
ways and means of organizing economic activity for the attainment
of social objectives under modern conditions." Reversion to smallscale business, with competition to regulate it, and control through
old-fashioned commands of the state, formulated in various ways
but in the end supported by penal sanctions,59 furnish the chief
reiances of such "liberal" proposals as have serious chances of
standards of competitive practice and not toward enforcible regulations.
Watkins, The Federal Trade Commission (1926) 40 Quar. 3. Econ. 578. Participation by interest groups in the selection of public officials is, however,
not uncommon. Chamberlain, Democratic Control of Administration (1927)
13 A. B. A. J. 186. This, in turn, shades into occasional delegation of actual
regulatory power to professional groups. Bradley v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Mass. 160, 150 N. E. 892 (1926); Note (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 80.
5Laski, A Grammar of Politics (1925) 244 et seq. sets forth an Heal
scheme of control of their internal affairs by functional groups and of consultation with such groups by government officials in the regulation of matters
in which the public interest is primary.
58 "We, like all other peoples in history, have allowed our social thought to
lag. The industrial system, which on the technical side is collectivism, exists
in the twentieth century; the system of thought we bring to it comes from the
eighteenth century. We are meeting the industrial system head-on with a
system of thought quite out of date. This holds alike for conservatives and
for liberals, for stand-patters and for reformers. If history teaches anything,
it teaches that the reformer always arrives on the spot one generation too
late." Hamilton, The Anti-Trust Law and the Social Control of Business, in
Handler, a Symposium on the Federal Anti-Trust Laws (1931) 10.
59 Regulation of business by administrative agencies, which is discussed
earlier in the text, obviously depends for its ultimate sanction upon penal
provisions. These do not require frequent invocation where the disposition to
use them is clear; but an evident reluctance to apply them, as in the case of
the N. R. A., or an inability to make them effective, as in the case of prohibition enforcement, quickly lead to a breakdown of the system of control.
As to the statutory techniques involved in penal regulation, as well as in the
less applicable "civil" regulation, see Freund, Legislative Regulation (1932).
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winning present public support in the United States.0 Private
labor-capital cooperation has seldom altered the power of control
or the distribution of income. When occasional excursions into
public ownership are made in the United States, either ad hoe
devices are employed 6 or existing bureaucratic or corporate patterns
of control are copied in varying combinations.62 In no instance of
public enterprise does there appear to have been an attempt to
create a form of organization which should so distribute control
that, by reason of participation by workers or consumers, the
economic objective of better distributing income would be furthered.
Reliance is always placed upon legislative prescription, supplemented by official discretion, to bring about proper service to the
"public". The interests of employees are almost never promoted,'
60 The purchase of compliance with legal requirements from affected private
persons by means of money payments, as under the A.A. A., or the direct
distribution of wealth by means of bonuses, subsidies, or relief are alternative measures which receive much current acceptance. Leaving out of account
the moral factors involved, such measures must be as limited as the ability
of the government to extract taxes or as ephemeral as the duration of a money
or credit inflation.
01 A number of "New Deal" enterprises, including the Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation, have taken the form of Delaware corporations,
indistinguishable, except for Federal ownership of their stock, from private
corporations. N. Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1934, § 1, at 4.
62 Even the T. V. A., widely heralded as an experiment which, unlike other
Now Deal agencies, is genuinely "socialistic" in character, contains no radical
departure from established models of government enterprise. Endowed with
corporate status in order to facilitate business transactions, legal processes,
and relatively independent accounting, the control of the Authority is vested
in a Board of three members which is essentially similar to a governmental
commission - engaged in this instance in managerial rather than regulatory
functions, but responsible to the Government alone. 48 Stat. 58, 16 U. S. C. A.
ff 831-831dd (1933). The freedom of the Authority from the ordinary laws
relating to government personnel enables it, however, to experiment, if it
wishes, in new forms of employment relations.
63 The proclamation of the president, assuming control of the transportation systems of the country for the duration of the World Whar, Dee. 26, 1917,
40 Stat. 1733, however, continued all applicable existing statutes, including
the Railway Labor Act, 30 Stat. 424 (1898), 38 Stat. 103, 45 U. S. C. A.
f 101-104 (1913), in effect. The same provision appears in the later Act
Providing for the Operation of the Transportation System, Mar. 21, 1918,
§ 10, 40 Stat. 456. The Canadian National Railways operate under collective
bargaining with unions as do the privately-owned carriers in the United States
and Canada.
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except for the security of tenure contained in occasional civil
service laws."
The control of private productive enterprises by managements
in which competing claimants to the benefit of their operation
participate has long been a dream of non-socialist democratic
thinkers who recognize that machine production has made individual bargaining by labor into an instrument of autocratic control
instead of a means of arriving at consensual arrangements. 5 Consideration has already been given to collective bargaining as a
means of group control of employment relations under private
ownership.' Extension of labor participation into other phases of
management by voluntary concession on the part of owners or by
arrangements effected through collective bargaining has been more
As has been
than a casual phenomenon since the World War."
pointed out,6" however, such schemes, even where they have been
genuine and have dealt with more than petty details, have largely
depended for such success as they have had upon the competitive
advantages which increased efficiency has afforded. If these were
eliminated by the general adoption of similar plans, it is doubtful
at best whether the participants would be able to resolve their conflict concerning the distribution of benefits in continued cooperation.69 Consumers, of course, have not been represented in such
schemes; but clearly they might be.
64 The outstanding example of protection to employees in what is essentially
a public economic undertaking is, of course, the prohibition of removals, except
for cause, in the classified postal service. 37 Stat. 555 (1912), 5 U. S. C. A.
652. The right of the employees in this service to belong to organizations for
the betterment of their status, so long as strikes are not contemplated, is
protected in the same section of the statutes against coercive use of the
removal power.
6 Brubre, The Main Business of Industry (1923) 50 Survey 133.
66 See page 343, supra.. See also the wvriter's Collective Labor Agreements
in German Law (1929) 15 St. Louis L. Rev. 1; The French Law of Collective
Labor Agreements (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 1005; Collective Labor Agreements
Under Administrative Regulation of Employment (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 493.
67 See the excellent review by J. B. S. Hardnan, Labor-Capital Cooperation,
8 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 624.
68Ibid.
6 Producers' cooperation has, for the most part, developed internal confficts
of interest which have prevented its success. Saposs, Producers' Cooperation,
12 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 458. Industrial Relations Councils within capitalist
industry have not displayed vitality. Guillebaud, Industrial Relations Commissions, 7 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 717.
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The development of consumers' cooperative enterprises, with full
employee participation in management and in the benefits of
increased efficiency, offers intriguing possibilities which go beyond
those suggested by labor-capital cooperation. There is more identity
of interest between consumers, who are also workers, and the
workers in a consumer-owned establishment, who are conscious of
their status as consumers, than there is between workers and the
owners of capital. The problem of developing an efficient, trustworthy management seems not to have presented undue difficulty
in the large-scale consumer cooperation of Europe. 0 Obviously
under a completely cooperative system, with no opportunities for
profit from the investment of capital, the temptation to graft on
the part of officials would be slight in any event, for the limits to
its attractiveness would be set by the capacity of the individual
and his family to consume the ill-gotten gain. The restrictive
feature in such a system would seem to be the limited ability of
the individual consumer-worker actually to participate in the affairs
of the numerous enterprises to which he would be a party.7 ' Popular control, however, could be as remote and sporadic as in the
modern democratic state without serious danger, so long as expert
direction was obtainable and predatory interests did not present a
72
menace from without.
On the whole, however, the political state affords, at least for the
time being, a more available, if not an inherently better agency
70 Gide, Consumer Cooperation, 4 Eneyc. Soc. Sciences 285, 290.

71 "Asked to elect masses of committees to perform all manner of representative functions on their behalf, and to keep their delegates constantly up to
the scratch by persistent attention to their doings, the mass of factory workers
would speedily settle the question for themselves by not bothering to vote, and
the committees would die of inanition." G. D. H. Cole, The Next Ten Years
in British Social and Economic Policy (1929) 161. Syndicalist and Guild
Socialist theories would almost certainly break down in application, because
of the fact thus pointed out.
72 "Subject to a broad control of economic policy and a continuous public
scrutiny of the results achieved, the consumer will find his best interest in
getting industrial administration into the hands of those most competent to
conduct it. He has, indeed, to secure that the work of production shall not
be interrupted unnecessarily by internal friction, and the assurance of the
right conditions to the producers therefore concerns him as consumer as well
as citizen. But, given this, he does not need to run industry, or to insist on
its administration by representative bodies elected by all the citizens. His
best course is to devolve industrial administration, as distinct from policy
control, upon the expert. . . ." Id. at 154.
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for introducing social considerations into the conduct of economic
enterprises than do workers' or consumers' cooperative organizations. The state can command the necessary capital more readily,
and it has developed administrative methods and personnel standards which can be availed of. It is not necessary that the state
assume complete ownership or management in order to introduce
its influence into economic undertakings. Partial stock ownership,
carrying with it participation in management, is a distinct possibility." Ownership of a natural resource essential to the conduct
of an industry or control over a franchise without which the
industry cannot function may be made the basis of government
participation in management.' Government enterprise in the key
portion of an economic process may become the means of controlling private enterprise in the remainder.75
Complete government ownership itself may be almost infinite in
its varieties." Coming increasingly into favor is the governmentowned corporation, of which there are numerous examples in the
United States, in England, and on the Continent of Europe."' Its
principal recognized advantages over bureaucratic operation of
public services lie in its greater adaptability, the possible differenSWebbink, Government Owned Corporations, 7 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 106,
citing the First and Second Banks of the United States and modern European
1'mixed" corporations for the supply of public services.
7 Tn the United States, franchise contracts have been made the basis of
attempted control over public utilities whose managements remained wholly
private, instead of a basis for public participation in management. Without
substantial administrative means of enforcement, such control has been largely
ineffective.
75 Thus the T. V. A. is required to control the rates to ultimate consumers
for electricity sold by the Authority to intermediate suppliers. 48 Stat. 65,
16 U. S. C. A. § 831k (1933). Similarly the British Central Electricity Board,
a corporate body, has as its chief function the acquisition or construction and
ownership of a unified system of main transmission lines and the purchase of
electricity from selected, privately owned generators and its sale to privately
owned suppliers, together with the exercise of extensive powers over generators so as to increase the eficiency of the unified system. 16 & 17 Geo. V,
c. 51 (1926). Regulation of service to consumers remains in the hands of the
Electricity Commission, a regulatory body. It has been suggested that the
Commission will prove to be superfluous when the Electricity Board's scheme
goes fully into operation. Dimock, British and American Utilities: A Comparison (1934) 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 265, 275.
76May, Government Ownership, 7 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 111.
77
Webbink, op. cit. supra note 73.
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tiation of its methods from cumbersome official procedures, and
the greater possibility of insulating it from political control. In
addition, the provision for means of consumer and employee
participation in management is more practicable in the case of
segregated public enterprises than in the case of bureaus which
are subject to all the usual laws relating to official methods and
personnel. The matters of adaptability and of differentiation in
methods are beyond the scope of this essay and probably are selfevident. Insulation from politics and participation in management by consumers and employees are, however, of the essence of
the problem under discussion.
As regards freedom from political control, the provision for
boards with long terms of office and overlapping tenure on the part
of members is an obvious device. Its effectiveness where it has
been tried cannot be measured objectively, and there is not even a
general estimate of its success or failure. Americans, including
lawyers, will be governed in their attitudes toward it largely by
their political and economic philosophy. The "spotted actuality"
will furnish different answers to different people. At least one
ingenious device for increasing the insulation from politics, however, deserves mention. The Act establishing the London Passenger
Transport Board'8 as a corporation for the operation of most of
the metropolitan communications of London provides for a board
of "Appointing Trustees" to exercise the function of naming the
members of the Transport Board. The Appointing Trustees are
the following: the chairman of the London County Council; a
representative of the Advisory Committee; the chairman of the
Committee of London Clearing Bankers; the president of the Law
Society; the president of the Institute of Chartered Accountants
in England and Wales; and, for the filling of vacancies after the
original creation of the Transport Board, a representative of that
Board itself. The "Advisory Committee", which is represented on
the board of Appointing Trustees, is a committee, representative
of various portions of the metropolitan. area and of various affected
interests including labor, which functions in connection with the
Transport Board. For the exercise of the appointing function an
ad hoc group, such as the Appointing Trustees, is probably to be
preferred to the system of direct appointments or nominations by
professional organizations or other established groups, which fre78 23 & 24 Geo. V. e. 14, § 1 (1933).
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quently are shot through with politics of their own. Offhand, one
would suppose the arrangement in the Act to be far more effective
in procuring able, impartial directors for the transport system
than the ordinary methods of selecting the directors of private
corporations.
Except in the advisory manner provided in the London Passenger
Transport organization, the introduction of consumer and employee
participation in the control of public corporate enterprises has not
been used in actual practice. In the Transport Act, however,
significant powers of investigation are conferred upon the Advisory
Committee, including the power to compel testimony.79 In addition,
the trade unions are recognized in the establishment of wages and
working conditions 0 and provision is made for the creation of a
system of permanent joint councils representative of the Transport
Board and of employees."' Clearly a form of economic enterprise
has been established under the Act which, in the absence of counterbalancing weaknesses springing from other causes, is more likely
than either the ordinary private or public undertaking to result in
a socially desirable distribution of benefits. 2
Several more or less well known proposals for the socialization
of particular industries have embodied the idea of direct consumer and employee participation in control. Schemes for the
nationalization of the British coal industry, publicly advocated by
responsible individuals and bodies, have provided for management
by national, district, and local councils, representative in varying
proportions of the Government, of consumers, and of manual, technical, and commercial employees. 3 In this country the plan of
two authors for the establishment of a monopoly in bituminous
coal under the ownership of a single corporation managed by a
79 Id. § 60, supplementing 14 & 15 Geo. V, c. 34, § 3.
80 Id. 9
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67, 68, 72.

Id. 9 69, 70.

In the report of Joseph B. Eastman, Federal Coordinator of Transportation, with reference to ultimate nationalization of the railroads of the United
States, provisions are recommended which are not dissimilar to those in the
London Passenger Transport Act. Thus the right of collective bargaining
would be guaranteed. An advisory board of twenty-four members, with full
access to all records and information in the possession of the railway administration, would be established. N. Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1934, § 1, at 3, 26.
8
3Lubin & Everett, The British Coal Dilemma (1927) 320-327.
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board of consumers' and workers' representatives84 should perhaps
not be classed with schemes for government-owned corporations;
for the proposed entity would not be under the continuous control
of government at all. Nevertheless, government would be called
upon to establish the new control through the use of coercive
powers over the present owners of coal properties to compel their
transfer; would exercise continuous scrutiny; and "must remain
the final judge of the organization", making such changes as might
prove, to be necessary." Investors would be paid a fixed return
upon the capital required. The celebrated "Plumb Plan""8 for the
railroads of the United States would involve government acquisition of the properties and their operation by a corporation
established for the purpose, whose directors would be representative
in equal proportion of the "public", the management, and the
employees. It requires no demonstration that such plans, if they
were applied to a substantial number of industries and if there
were no counterbalancing weaknesses, would go far in the direction
of effecting a distribution of income far different from the concentration which is the root cause of present economic difficulties.
Bureaucratic management of public services has impressive works
to its credit." Outstanding on the North American Continent is
Of realistic
the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission."
appraisal of bureaucracy as an economic manager in terms of
efficiency and social distribution of benefits there is as yet, however,
relatively little. It can only be suggested that the governmental
process is basically designed for the service of the general welfare
and that there is no inherent obstacle to making it efficient as well
as benevolent, provided suitable incentives can be drawn upon.
Its uniformity, however, and the lack of employee participation
in policy determination make it a less likely candidate than the
public corporation for the r6le of distributor of economic income.
84

Hamilton & Wright, A Way of Order for Bituminous Coal (1928).
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Id. at 255.

88 Plumb & Roylanee, Industrial Democracy (1923) 197-200.
87 "All factors considered, the Post Office's management of British telephones, in which the department is assisted by a firm of public relations consultants, probably surpasses that of any other public utility in Great Britain." Dhnock, British and American Public Utilities: A Comparison (1934)
1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 265, 281.
83Mosher & Associates, Electrical Utilities (1929) 222-267.
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The problem of incentives, where the profit motive is not relied
upon as the mainspring, is basic to the entire question of government ownership and management. Again there is much that needs
to be done by way of experiment and exploration. Accurate
analysis reveals little that is flattering to private corporate enterprise and much that is hopeful in public enterprise."5 And this
question is of the essence of the lawyer's problem-namely, the
procedure for getting things done through law.9" The mists of
traditional, cynical views of "human nature" and of idealized
theories of the operation of the search for private gain badly need
to be blown away.

V
The foregoing sketchy survey will have served its purpose if it
aids in pointing out the principal lines of advance that are possible
89Dodd, Is Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers
Practicable? (1935) 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 194.
90
It is one of the ironies of the position of the legal profession in the
United States at present that its attention in regard to government regulation of economic activity is so largely directed to matters lying outside its
special competence, with relatively little emphasis upon considerations belonging peculiarly within the legal field. Thus large issues of policy, couched in
terms of constitutional doctrine, are debated among lawyers ranged on the
two sides of the fence that separates the advocates of the New Deal from its
opponents. Now the question of how far business men may rightly be subjected to statutory controls presents issues of liberty as against public
authority which concern all individuals as people, as well as issues of economic
wisdom upon which only those with economic exTerience or training are especially qualified to throw light. There are involved, also, questions of procedure
and of administrative efficiency upon which lawyers as lawyers are entitled to
particular deference. Yet members of the legal profession often lay claim to
superior authority in regard to all constitutional questions and persist in
couching even such obviously administrative issues as the desirable size of
governmental units, upon which lawyers might be expected to offer genuine
wisdom, in terms of high-sounding issues of liberty and the "right" of "local"
self-government as against central authority. As the American government
is organized, of course, the profession cannot escape the necessity of presenting all pertinent constitutional questions to the courts and of having such
of its members as are elevated to the bench decide these questions with
finality. The emphasis in professional literature ought to be placed, however,
upon the realistic and fair presentation of these issues rather than upon the
direction in which the decision should go, except in so far as administrative
and procedural points are involved. See Bikle, Judicial Determinations of
Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action
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in solving the economic difficulties of the twentieth century by
means of law. In its public capacitr the legal profession has no
more important duty than the impartial appraisal of these alternatives, without regard to fears or slogans which, for the most part,
have little bearing upon procedural realities.
(1924) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 6; Denman, Comment on Trials of Fact in Constitutional Cases (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 805. A somewhat greater skepticism
regarding the wisdom of having lawyers solely entrusted with the decision of
fundamental questions of statecraft would betoken a profession better equipped
to handle the matters more especially requiring its attention, such as ways
and means of fairly and efficiently knitting together organized control by
economic groups under the supervision of government -rthe
task which was
so disastrously botched by the National Recovery Administration. The American Bar Association's Special Committee on Administrative Law, whatever
may be thought of the validity of its approach and its conclusions, properly
concerns itself with those procedural realities in the control of business which
lie peculiarly with the province of lawyers. (1933) 58 A. B. A. Rep. 407;
(1934) 59 id. at 539.

